Why BitChat Will Thrive and No Government Can Ban It
Once BitChat is installed on a device, it can continue operating offline, relaying messages from phone to phone without relying on any central infrastructure.
When Napster was shut down in the early 2000s, music piracy didn't disappear; it evolved. BitTorrent replaced centralised servers. When Telegram channels were blocked in some countries, users found mirrors and VPNs. The point is, every attempt to suppress digital technologies has been met with a more decentralised alternative.
Now, India finds itself confronting a similar challenge with BitChat, the offline messaging app created by Twitter co-founder Jack Dorsey. Amid the student-led protest at Jantar Mantar demanding the resignation of Indian Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan, the Indian government ordered GitHub to take down BitChat's source code. The internet too was shut down for several hours to bar communication among protesters in the national capital.
the government of india does not like technologies like bitchat and wants it taken down pic.twitter.com/gjzMg1NGCi
— jack (@jack) July 24, 2026
However, BitChat is like no other messaging application. It's decentralised in its truest sense, meaning there are no for-profit or non-profit companies behind it running its infrastructure.
A Different Kind of Messaging App
Unlike WhatsApp, Signal, or Telegram, BitChat does not route messages through servers. It creates a Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) mesh network, where every nearby phone acts as both a sender and a relay.
It runs on a Bluetooth mesh network, requiring no internet, SIM card, phone number, or central server. It gained attention because it allowed users to keep communicating even during internet shutdowns.
That's also why taking it down is far more difficult than removing a typical app. Once BitChat is installed on a device, it can continue operating offline, relaying messages from phone to phone without relying on any central infrastructure.
Even if the original code is removed from GitHub, the software can survive because it is open-source. Copies of the code can be mirrored across decentralised platforms, and every developer or user who downloads it becomes another distribution point beyond the reach of a single takedown order.
Earlier this year, China removed BitChat from the App Store citing regulatory concerns. But it's not a kill switch, but rather a precautionary step. The apps can still be transferred over devices and downloaded from other sources.
Governments can compel companies to remove content or apps from centralised platforms because there is a legal entity to target. Decentralised, open-source projects operate differently. They have no single owner, server, or point of control.
There is no central company for governments to serve notices to or pressure, unlike platforms such as Twitter (now X) and other mainstream apps that authorities have previously targeted.
With decentralised networks like BitChat, there is no single owner, server, or point of control to shut down. Reportedly, within hours of the GitHub takedown, The Left Shift learnt that developers in India mirrored BitChat's source code on decentralised platforms like Radicle, which has no central server or company to target.
When Security Agencies Hate BitChat?
Encrypted messaging once challenged surveillance because governments could no longer easily read conversations. Decentralised communication goes a step further by questioning whether governments can even control the infrastructure those conversations depend on.
Supporters argue such tools are invaluable during natural disasters, network failures, and internet shutdowns. After earthquakes, hurricanes, or widespread outages, mesh networking can keep communities connected when conventional telecom infrastructure fails. Protesters also see decentralised apps as a safeguard against communication blackouts.
Security agencies, however, raise legitimate concerns. Applications that resist interception could complicate criminal investigations, counterterrorism operations, and emergency response. An application like BitChat could pose significant challenges in regions like Jammu & Kashmir, where security agencies are engaged in counterterrorism operations and rely on lawful interception of communications to track militant activities.
The debate, therefore, is not simply about one app but about how societies balance privacy, public safety, and state authority. That balance will become even more difficult as decentralised technologies mature. Bluetooth mesh is only the beginning.
Future communication systems may combine local wireless networking with satellite connectivity, device-to-device protocols, and distributed identity systems that are even harder to regulate.
In that context, banning BitChat resembles trying to stop peer-to-peer file sharing by shutting down a single website. It may inconvenience users temporarily, but it does little to address the underlying technology.
Governments can regulate app stores, order internet service providers to block websites, and seek takedowns of source code repositories. They cannot easily prohibit software that already exists on millions of devices and communicates without the internet itself. According to data, BitChat crossed 330,000 users in India this week.
Whether BitChat ultimately succeeds is almost beside the point. The app has demonstrated that the future of communication may no longer depend on centralised networks that governments or companies control.